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  1Abstract 
 
This study analyzes U.S. consumers’ valuation of five types of genetically 
modified food labels on a cornflakes cereal product.  Using a nationwide survey and 
choice-modeling framework, results indicate that consumers value the label “contains no 
genetically modified corn” the most with a mean willingness to pay of 20 more cents, 
followed by “USDA approved genetically modified corn” with a mean willingness to pay 
of 9 more cents, and “corn genetically modified to reduce pesticide residues in your 
food” with a mean willingness to pay of 7 more cents.  Results also suggest that 
consumers negatively value the labels “contains genetically modified corn” with a mean 
willingness to pay of 13 less cents and “may contain genetically modified corn” with a 
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Labeling of genetically modified (GM) foods remains a contentious issue.  To 
date, there is no conclusive research done on how GM food products should be labeled or 
on whether consumers would value such labeling information in the U.S.  Globally, 
countries are grappling to come to a consensus on a harmonized and internationally 
acceptable system. In the European Union (EU), regulations related to mandatory 
labeling of GM foods are already in place.  In contrast, the U.S. has no mandatory 
labeling requirements pertaining to GM foods. In its various forms, Einsiedel (2000) has 
concluded that labeling of genetically modified products is bound to impact food 
marketing significantly.  
While disagreements on a harmonized GM labeling policy persist, adoption of 
genetically modified crops worldwide is on the increase. To date, 20% of global 
soybeans, corn, cotton and canola acres are genetically modified, with the United States, 
Argentina, Canada and China being leading growers of GM crops (James, 2003; Pew 
Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, 2004). Interestingly, on the consumption side, 
estimates suggest that between 60% and 70% of processed foods on American 
supermarkets include at least a fragment of a GM crop and yet most consumers are not 
aware of this.  Hallman et al. (2004) also found that 69% of the American public did not 
know that GM foods are tested for human safety and three-quarters did not know that 
GM foods are tested for environmental safety.   
A number of countries have passed some form of regulatory framework on GM, 
ranging from total bans on GM technology to requiring either mandatory or voluntary 
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influence of differences in political and economic structures on policy (Teisl, Garner, Roe 
and Vayda, 2003). For example, the mandatory labeling regime in the EU may have to do 
more with ethical/moral considerations.  In contrast to the EU’s approach, the U.S 
voluntary labeling regime only requires labeling of GM foods if: it has a significantly 
different nutritional property; it includes an allergen that consumers would not expect to 
be present; and it contains a toxicant beyond acceptable limits.  There are challenging 
implications of a mandatory labeling regime for GM foods.  For example, mandatory 
labeling may require segregation imposed on the entire agricultural system, thus 
increasing the cost of providing the information (Huygen, Veeman, and Lerohl, 2003; 
Muth, Mancini and Viator, 2003).  Hence, GM labeling might cost the consumers, 
industry and government in varying degrees (Caswell, 2000; Runge and Jackson, 2000).  
A few studies have investigated consumer willingness to pay for GM labeling.  
Most of the research on the subject has examined advantages/disadvantages of types of 
implementation and the likely costs (Huygen, Veeman, and Lerohl, 2003).  In particular, 
support and opposition to mandatory or voluntary labeling regimes has been a popular 
subject of study (Huffman et al., 2004; Caswell 1998, 2000; Carter and Gruère, 2003). 
An important conclusion is that a successful label must contain features that appeal to 
consumers, truthful and not misleading, and driven by free market demands.  Also 
investigated are topics related to information asymmetry on producers, government and 
industry as well as label information prioritizing (Huffman, 2003; Fulton and Giannakas, 
2004; McCluskey and Loureiro, 2003; Senhui, Fletcher, and Rimal, 2003).  Other studies 
have focused on language and label positioning (e.g., Hallman, Aquino and Phillips, 
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willingness to pay for a mandatory, voluntary or total bans for beef, pork and eggs in 
Sweden.  The findings of the study show that GM food can be a credence good that can 
cause market failure.  Additionally, the study found that consumers are also willing to 
pay a significantly higher product price to ensure a total ban on the use of GM in animal 
fodder.  None of these studies, however, have investigated consumer valuation of 
different GM label statements. 
To fill this void, this study assesses consumers’ valuation of GM labels. In 
particular, this study contributes to the ongoing debate by assessing consumers’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for the information provided by GM labels.  Findings from 
recent focus group studies in the U.S. suggest that the wording on labels could have a 
significant effect on consumer understanding and acceptance of biotechnology (Hallman, 
Aquino and Phillips, 2003).  There are also concerns as to whether consumers would use 
such labels (Quan, McCluskey, and Wahl, 2004; Teisl et al., 2003).  This study measures 
consumer’s willingness to pay for the information provided by GM labels, by estimating 
marginal effects of and relationships between specific labeling statements.  Consumer 
choice of GM food labels is analyzed within the choice-modeling framework (Louviere, 
Hensher, and Swait, 2000).  Specifically, the study analyzes (i) how consumers value 
labeling information and (ii) the differential valuation of labeling information by content 
(i.e., from no information to detailed information).   Various parameters such as price 
elasticities with respect to various labeling statements are obtained.  The following 
sections will discuss the empirical model, survey methods, results, and conclusions. 
 
  3Empirical Model 
 
Consumer preferences over GM labeling type are analyzed within the random 
utility discrete choice model framework (McFadden, 1978; Revelt and Train, 1998). 
Since market data for GM food labels are not available, a choice-modeling framework is 
used.  In this framework, the consumer is assumed to have a well-behaved utility function  
(i.e., with preferences that are complete, reflexive and transitive).  The consumer is then 
able to compare and rank alternative commodity bundles.  In relation to particular choice 
set, the various options available are contained in a universal choice set C.  A consumer i 
may consider all, or only a subset of these options and either chooses one of these options 
or chooses none of them.  The Lancaster (1966a,b) model provides the framework within 
which the type of label wording chosen by consumers is analyzed. In this model, 
consumer i derives utility (Uij) from chosen option j, where Zij is the vector of attributes 
of option j available to this individual. Si  is the vector of his/her socioeconomic 
characteristics: 
   (1)  (,) ij ij i UU z S =
However the above utility function cannot be observed. Thus, it is further 
assumed that the utility function is decomposed into the deterministic part, which is 
observed by the researcher and a random component, which is unobservable given by:  
  ij ij ij mj mj j UV Z ε β =+= + ε  (2) 
where Uij is the latent utility associated with choice j , Vij is the explainable part of latent 
utility and εij is the random component of utility associated with choice j.  The 
consumer’s decision process involves defining the choice problem, generating the 
alternatives, evaluating the attributes of the alternative, making a choice, and 
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probability that the consumer chooses the option j is given by:  
  Pr( / ) Pr( ) ( ), ( ) ij ij in in jC j V V n j C ε ε == + > + ∀ ≠∈     (3) 
The model is implemented by making assumption about the distribution εj. 
Assuming that εj are iid with type-I extreme value (Gumbel) distribution, the probability 
that the consumer chooses option j is given by (McFadden, 1973):  
  () e x p e x p im m j
mj m
Py j z z β
⎛⎞⎛
== ⎜⎟⎜
⎝⎠⎝⎠ ∑∑ ∑ m m j β
⎞
⎟  (4) 
which leads to the standard conditional logit model. However, the above model suffers 
from the restrictive Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, and 
therefore, is unable to incorporate preference heterogeneity across consumers. To address 
this problem, we will model consumer preference using the random coefficient logistic 
(random parameter) model. In this framework, it is assumed that βij (βj associated with 
consumer i) is random across individual consumers whose distribution can be specified as 
follows:  
  ij j kj ik k ik
k
x u ββ θ σ =+ + ∑  (5) 
where uik is normally distributed with correlation matrix R, σk is the standard deviation of 
the distribution,  j kj ik x βθ +∑ is the mean of the distribution that depend on xik 
representing person-specific (observable) characteristics, and uik are random errors that 
capture unobservable and excluded consumer attributes. In this formulation,  j β reflects 
the  average taste (preference) of all consumers for choice j and  kj ik x θ ∑ denotes the 
variation (or deviation) of individual preference that depends on observable consumer 
characteristics. The constant term b can be portioned into alternative specific constants 
(ASC) that are unique to each alternative that are considered in the choice sets. ASC 
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alternative. 
Substituting equation (5) in equation (2), the random utility function can be 
written as:  
  ij m im km ik im im k ik
mm k m
Uz x z z βθ =+ + ∑∑ ∑ ∑ u σ  (6) 
In this model, the mean utility is  mi m z β ∑  which depends only on product attributes (zij) 
and thus, it is a product specific component that does not depend on consumer 
characteristics. On the other hand, heterogeneity in preferences depends on the 
interaction between product attributes and consumer characteristics. The parameters of 
the model are estimated using the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator. 
Survey Methods 
A survey instrument developed by the Food Policy Institute, Rutgers University was 
used to collect data for this study.  The survey collected information on core questions 
related to American awareness and knowledge of GM food, willingness to purchase GM 
products, attitudes toward risks and benefits, opinions on mandatory product labeling and 
overall approval of the transgenic technique as it relates to animal and plant 
biotechnology. The Food Policy Institute contracted the opinion polling firm, Shulman, 
Ronca, and Bucuvalas, Inc. to conduct 1,201 telephone interviews using computer-
assisted telephone interview (CATI) technology.  
Interviewers were consistently monitored throughout the field period. The interviews 
were conducted between May 4, 2004 and June 14th, 2004. To reduce interview time, 
there were two versions of the survey in which core questions remained the same but 
with different supplemental questions divided between the two versions. Version A had 
  6601 respondents and an average interview time of 19.5 minutes and Version B had 600 
respondents and an average interview time of 21.9 minutes. All interviews were 
conducted in English. Potential respondents were selected using national random digit 
dialing across all 50 states. U.S. Census Bureau population estimates determined the 
distribution necessary for proportionate geographic coverage. The CATI program guided 
a random but balanced selection process to ensure that representative numbers of males 
and females were interviewed.   
  Many of the telephone numbers originally selected as part of the sampling frame 
were excluded as non-residential or non-working numbers. Only 25% of the numbers 
selected at random yielded completed interviews. However, calls to 66% of the working 
residential numbers resulted in completed interviews
1. When weighted, the 1,201 
completed interviews have a sampling error rate of ±3%. For those questions asked of 
only half the sample (the adjusted N will be indicated in text and tables where 
appropriate), the sampling error rate increases to ±4%. After completing the telephone 
survey, the 1,201 respondents were asked to receive a mail questionnaire.  47 % of the 
respondents (559) agreed to receive a mail questionnaire and gave a valid mailing 
address. Respondents were mailed the questionnaire and $5.00 within 3 to 4 days of 
agreeing to receive a mail questionnaire.  All questionnaires were sent first class mail 
                                                 
1 To achieve the maximum response rate, many working numbers were attempted 16 or more 
times. Numbers were dialed on different days of the week and at varying times of day in an effort 
to reach elusive respondents. For households that used call-blocking systems, the research 
company allowed identifying information to be displayed. If an answering machine picked up 
three times in a row on any given number, interviewers left messages identifying the research 
company and the purpose of the call.   
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based on no response within 14 days after first mailing, with a second questionnaire 
(without the $5.00 gratuity) being mailed once again. A total of 363(65%) surveys were 
returned, of which 7 were incomplete (1%).  
  Based on previous labeling focus-group research (Hallman, Aquino and Phillips, 
2003), a decision was made on the product to be analyzed. The product had to be readily 
available in stores, was familiar to majority of consumers, and is partly made of GM 
ingredients. Cornflakes were selected on account of the three factors. Care also had to be 
taken in explaining the CM part of the questionnaire; this included any traces of biases 
introduced by giving the subject prominence over other issues related to GM subject in 
totality. 
  One section was devoted to providing background information on genetic 
modification and labeling. In terms of background, the following information was 
provided:  Definition of GM: “Genetic modification used in food production involves 
methods that make it possible for scientists to create new varieties of plants and animals 
by taking parts of the genes of one plant or animal and inserting them into the cells of 
another plant or animal.  This is sometimes called genetic engineering or biotechnology. 
Currently, 40% of the corn grown in the United States is a genetically modified variety.  
This corn is approved by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to be as 
safe for human consumption as the corn grown using traditional farming methods.   
Because genetically modified corn is sometimes mixed with traditional corn during 
storage and transport, food products that have corn ingredients (like cornflakes) may or 
may not contain genetically modified corn. The only way for you to know for sure if 
  8cornflakes are made from genetically modified corn or not is if the manufacturers put this 
information on their product’s label.”   
  In addition, respondents were provided this information about the GM labels: 
“There are 6 types of special labeling information concerning the possible presence or 
absence of genetically modified corn in the cereal.   The information should be viewed as 
entirely truthful. This information will vary for products A and B, but choice C will 
always have no special label.  “No special label” means there is no indication as to 
whether or not the cornflakes contain genetically modified corn. Please note that the 
initials USDA used on some of the food labels means the United States Department of 
Agriculture.” (see Table 1). 
Another section of the choice-modeling questionnaire provided instructions on 
choice selection on their stated GM labeling preferences. The instructions were: 
“Carefully read and think about each question since you will be asked to select the box of 
cornflakes you most prefer out of three possible boxes of cornflakes. There are no right or 
wrong answers; we are only interested in your opinion.”  The choice modeling questions 
were pretested at Rutgers with suggestions to put  “Price”, and  “labeling statements” as 
row headings and "Survey Instructions" at the top of the page.  
The execution and planning of the mail survey was a stepwise procedure with the 
experimental design for the choice modeling first being subjected to several lengthy 
discussions by researchers and reference was made on existing GM labeling literature. 
Possible statements on label were discussed and it was agreed that the statements should 
reflect the amount of information on an incremental basis. The labeling information 
provided by the statements ranged from NO information, some information to detailed 
  9information about the label. The information was cast in terms of label usefulness to the 
consumer decision-making process (Caswell, 2000).  
Careful planning before execution of the CM experiment took into account the 
following: objectively elicit consumer stated willingness to pay for GM labeling 
information. A fraction factorial experiment design was used to create a balanced and 
efficient design matrix for a number of choice sets. The product to be analyzed was 
characterized by two (factors): label and price each with five different levels. The Choice 
modeling experiment yielded 32 choice sets. After removal of the dominated choices, 28 
choice sets remained. Two of the alternatives in each choice set were all variants of a 
labeling and price variation scheme. Status quo was the third alterative (No special label), 
which was constant and common to all choice sets across the three products. The 28 
choice sets were split into 4 subsets, with each respondent randomly allocated one set of 
7 questions to complete.  In this study, the six different labeling statements and price 
levels are as shown in table 1.  
The actual choice questions were posed in the following manner:  “Imagine you 
are at the grocery store and want to buy a box of cornflakes.  You have to choose among 
three boxes of cornflakes: A, B or C.  Which will you choose?  You’ll be asked to do this 
7 times.  While the combination of products may seem the same, they are all slightly 
different.  Choose carefully and read all of the information given. By combining your 
choices with those of others, we’ll be able to better understand what’s important to 
consumers.”(For an example, see Table 2).  The cornflakes contain the exact same 
ingredients except that some contain genetically modified corn and some do not contain 
genetically modified corn. They will differ from each other on the basis of price, the 
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product.  The boxes are all the same weight and the cornflakes all look and taste exactly 
the same. You can choose from cornflakes A, B, or C.” 
General Results 
 
  The random parameter logit model results as well as the random attributes 
correlations, elasticities, marginal willingness to pay for the labeling statements, and the 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The estimated 
mean for price and both the estimated mean and standard deviations of the random 
attributes are also reported. The model was estimated with simulated maximum 
likelihood using the Halton draws with 250 replications.   
The mail survey was administered to those who agreed to participate (559).  363 
surveys were returned of which 7 were incomplete.  Hence, in this analysis, we use the 
356 completed surveys. Although these surveys yielded 7476 choice sets, after removal 
of lexicographic responses, 7182 choice sets were actually analyzed (96% of clean choice 
sets).  
The results show both negative and positive labeling valuations.  Results on 
consumer’s mean willingness to pay are presented in Table 3 and Figure 1. The results 
show monetary values for the labeling statements given per unit change in price. The 
values were estimated by evaluating the ratio of the labeling statement coefficient to the 
coefficient of price.  Positive mean willingness to pay was associated with the following 
labeling statements: “Contains NO genetically modified corn” (20.29 cents); “USDA 
approved genetically modified corn” (9.13 cents); and “Corn genetically modified to 
reduce pesticide residues in food” (7.32 cents).  The results also show how much it will 
  11take consumers to accept certain labeling statements. Consumers will require a discount 
of 1% for the statement  “may contain GM corn” (-2.0 cents) and a discount of 6.5% for 
the statement “contains genetically modified corn” (-13.11 cents).  The own and cross 
price elasticities have the expected signs and are of almost similar magnitude for choice 
A and B, with the status quo choice having relatively smaller magnitude compared to 
those of choice A or B.   
Concluding Comments 
Evidence from public polls in the U.S and elsewhere show overwhelming support 
to label GM foods. Findings from a recent national survey show that 94% of U.S 
consumers agree that GM ingredients should be labeled. Similar results were obtained 
from a consumer survey in France, Germany and UK showing 90% support for 
mandatory labeling of beef produced from cattle fed on genetically modified crops 
(Hallman et al., 2003, 2004; Roosen, Lusk and Fox, 2001).  Despite the overwhelming 
support for GM labeling in the U.S. among consumers, no known study has evaluated 
how consumers would value different types of GM labeling statements.  This paper 
examined consumer attitudes towards GM foods in the context of labeling and the 
tradeoffs made between labeling statements. The results of this study show that the 
choice modeling experiments provided a way of valuing labeling statements on 
cornflakes, thus giving some direction as to what the consumers’ preferences will be if 
GM products had to be labeled.  Consumer preference for a GM label is influenced by the 
nature of information conveyed by different labeling statements.  Results generally 
suggest that statements that inform the consumer about product certification and benefit 
are valued positively.  On the other hand, statements that indicate only the possible 
  12presence of GM are valued negatively. Consumer’ willingness to pay a premium for 
certain label statements such as “contains no GM corn”, “USDA approved GM corn”, 
and “corn genetically modified to reduce pesticide residues in your food” shows that 
there is potential market for GM labels.  The differences in the valuation of the 
statements also imply that some statements are preferred than others. 
    The information generated by this study can be used as a guide by the food 
industry and the government in the design of possible labeling schemes that are 
acceptable and valued by consumers.  Future studies, however, should replicate the 
present study to assess the robustness of these findings.  In addition, other labeling 
statements not included in this study should be considered in the future.  
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Table 1: Cornflakes attributes and levels  
Attribute   Levels 
Price Levels  Current price ($2.00) 
15 % discount ($1.70) 
10 % discount ($1.80) 
5 % discount ($1.90) 
5 % premium ($2.10) 
Labeling   No special label (no label) 
Contains no genetically modified corn 
May contain genetically modified corn 
Contains genetically modified corn 
Corn genetically modified to reduce pesticide residues in your food 






Table 2:  Choice Example: Based on the following information which would you 
choose box A, B, or C?   Please place an X in one box only below. 
 
         
  Cornflakes A    Cornflakes B    Cornflakes C 











 “No  special  label”
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates of The Mixed Logit Model (Normally distributed random 
parameters) and Mean Willingness to Pay Values 
Variable   Coefficient  t-ratio  p-value 
PRICE -0.1146  -3.89  0.00 
Contains NO genetically modified 
corn  Mean Coefficient  2.3246  9.94  0.00 
 
Standard Deviation of the 
Coefficient  2.6977 10.43 0.00 
May contain genetically modified 
corn  Mean Coefficient  -0.2293  -1.12  0.26 
 
Standard Deviation of the 
Coefficient  2.4128 10.50 0.00 
Contains genetically modified corn Mean Coefficient  -1.5020  -5.16  0.00 
 
Standard Deviation of the 
Coefficient  3.2473 9.66 0.00 
Corn genetically modified to 
reduce pesticide residues in your 
food  Mean Coefficient  0.8386  2.73  0.01 
 
Standard Deviation of the 
Coefficient  5.3254 10.87 0.00 
USDA approved genetically 
modified corn  Mean Coefficient  1.0459  3.26  0.00 
 
Standard Deviation of the 
Coefficient  4.9918 8.10 0.00 
Model statistics         
Log Likelihood  -963.21       
Restricted Log Likelihood  -1386.29       
Chi Square  846.17       
DF 39       
Mean Willingness to Pay 




Contains NO genetically modified 
corn 
20.29 23.54  -26.79  67.38 
May contain genetically modified 
corn 
-2.00 21.06  -49.08  40.11 
Contains genetically modified corn -13.11  28.34  -60.19  43.57 
Corn genetically modified to 
reduce pesticide residues in your 
food 
7.32 46.48  -39.76  100.27 
USDA approved genetically 
modified corn 
9.13 43.57  -37.95  96.26 
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Contains NO genetically 
modified corn  1  0.363  0.086  0.087  0.152 
May contain genetically 
modified corn   1  -0.897  -0.665  -0.656 
Contains genetically 
modified corn     1  0.756  0.755 
Corn genetically modified 
to reduce pesticide 
residues in your food      1 0.3691 
USDA approved 
genetically modified corn        1 
          
Price elasticity Estimates (estimated marginal utility increase of 1 % in Price) 
 K=1  K=2  K=3     
j=1 -0.145  0.09  0.092     
j=2 0.077  -0.156  0.079     
j=3 0.017  0.018  -0.05     
K= is attribute reflecting changes in price 
j=1,2, and 3 (i.e., of A, B, and C alternatives/ choices in a set ) 
 















Contains GM  Corn M ay contain GM  corn Corn genetically modified
to reduce pesticide
residues in your food
USDA approved
genetically modified corn
Contains NO GM  corn
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